PA Funeral Dir. Assn. v. FTC by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-17-1994 
PA Funeral Dir. Assn. v. FTC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"PA Funeral Dir. Assn. v. FTC" (1994). 1994 Decisions. 155. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/155 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                 
 
                           No. 94-3015 
                        
 
 PENNSYLVANIA FUNERAL DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
 




 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
 
                      Respondent 
                 
 
 Petition for Review of the Federal Trade Commission's 
 Amended Funeral Industry Practices Regulation Rule 
                 
 
 Argued August 2, 1994 
 
 BEFORE:  STAPLETON and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, 
                 and ATKINS,* Senior District Judge 
 
 (Filed October 17, 1994) 
                 
 
 
    T. Scott Gilligan (Argued) 
    Kepley, MacConnell & Eyrich  
    525 Vine Street Suite 2200 
    Cincinnati, OH 45202 
 
      Attorney for Petitioner 
      and Intervenor 
 
 
    Jay C. Schaeffer 
    Acting General Counsel 
    Ernest J. Isenstadt 
    Assistant General Counsel 
    Joanne L. Levine (Argued) 
    Federal Trade Commission 
    6th & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 




*  Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, Senior United States District Judge 
for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation. 
  
    Of Counsel: 
    Matthew Daynard 
    Bureau of Consumer Protection 
    Federal Trade Commission 
    6th & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 
    Washington D.C. 20580 
 
      Attorneys for Respondent 
 
 
    Cathy Ventrell-Monsees 
    Steven S. Zaleznick 
    W. Kent Brunette 
    Deborah M. Zuckerman 
    American Association of Retired  
   Persons 
    601 E Street, N.W. 
    Washington D.C. 20049 
 
    Of Counsel: 
    Allen Larson 
    Eugene Curry 
    Larson & Curry 
    Route 28-1185 Falmouth Rd. 
    P.O. Box 2730 
    Hyannis, MA 02601 
      
      Attorneys for Amicus 
Curiae 
 
                 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                 
 
 
ATKINS, Senior District Judge: 
 
 
 The Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association, Inc. 
and the National Funeral Directors Association of the United 
States, Inc. as intervenor (collectively "PFDA"), have petitioned 
this court, pursuant to Section 18(e) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e), for review of the 
  
Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") amended Funeral Industry 
Practices Rule.  The PFDA specifically asks this court to 
invalidate an amendment to the original Funeral Industry 
Practices Rule ("Funeral Rule") which prohibits all funeral 
service providers from charging consumers a "casket handling fee" 
in instances where the consumer has purchased a casket from a 
party other than the funeral service provider -- i.e., from a 
third party casket vendor.  The PFDA contends that the FTC's 
decision to implement a ban on casket handling fees was arbitrary 
and capricious and that the factual findings underlying that 
decision were unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
rulemaking record taken as a whole.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the amended Funeral Rule, and in particular 
the ban on casket handling fees. 
 
 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On September 24, 1982, the FTC promulgated the Funeral 
Rule, which prohibited certain unfair and deceptive practices in 
the funeral service industry.  Trade Regulation Rule;  Funeral 
Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. Part 453 (1982).  The FTC's 
decision to issue the Funeral Rule was appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit, and was affirmed in Harry & Bryant Co. v. FTC, 726 F.2d 
993 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).  The 
Funeral Rule became effective on April 30, 1984. 
 One section of the Funeral Rule required the FTC to 
initiate rulemaking proceedings within four years of the 
effective date of the Funeral Rule to determine whether the 
  
Funeral Rule should be amended or repealed.  Pursuant to this 
provision, the FTC issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on May 31, 1988, which included the proposed language 
for the amendment under challenge in this case. 
 In January, 1994, after comprehensive rulemaking 
proceedings, the FTC adopted the amendment to the Funeral Rule 
which is at issue here;  that amendment bans casket handling 
fees.  On January 14, 1994, the PFDA petitioned this court for 
review of the amendment.  The National Funeral Directors 
Association of the United States, Inc., of which Pennsylvania 
Funeral Directors Association, Inc. is a member, sought and was 
granted permission to intervene. 
 
 FACTS 
The Funeral Rule 
 The Funeral Rule was enacted on September 24, 1982, 
after extensive rulemaking proceedings and became fully effective 
on April 30, 1984.  The Funeral Rule was premised on evidence 
that consumers are uniquely disadvantaged when they purchase 
funeral services after the death of a loved one, due to grief, 
time constraints, and inexperience.  Additionally, the evidence 
showed that funeral service providers often sold only preselected 
packages of goods and services such that consumers were forced to 
purchase goods and services they did not want. 
 Therefore, the Funeral Rule set forth several 
requirements and prohibitions to remedy the unfair practices.  
Specifically, the Funeral Rule required funeral service providers 
  
to disclose prices over the telephone and to supply each customer 
with an itemized price list with every service and good that the 
provider sold.  Additionally, the Funeral Rule required funeral 
service providers to "unbundle" their price packages, forbidding 
them from requiring the purchase of a casket for direct 
cremations and from conditioning the purchase of funeral goods or 
services on the purchase of any other goods or services;1  the 
purpose was to prevent funeral service providers from forcing 
customers to purchase goods or services they did not want.2  
However, recognizing that each funeral requires the service of a 
funeral director and staff, the Funeral Rule permitted funeral 
service providers to charge a non-declinable fee for their 
professional services. 
 Several groups challenged the promulgation of the 
Funeral Rule in 1982 on evidentiary, policy, procedural, 
statutory, and constitutional bases.  However, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected the challenge and affirmed the Funeral Rule.  Harry & 
Bryant, 726 F.2d 993. 
The Amendment Procedures 
 The Funeral Rule specified that, four years after it 
took effect, the FTC would initiate a rulemaking amendment 
proceeding to determine whether the Funeral Rule was operating 
                     
 
   1Funeral service providers could still offer packages as an 
option to consumers, but they had to offer each good and service 
separately, as well. 
    
2Other provisions exist in the Funeral Rule, but they are not 
relevant to our decision regarding the challenged amendment. 
  
effectively, whether any amendments to the Funeral Rule were 
needed, and whether the entire rule should be repealed.  The FTC 
started the rulemaking proceedings in December, 1987, when it 
solicited comments on the Funeral Rule from consumers and funeral 
service providers.  More than 350 comments were submitted.  The 
majority of the comments came from people and entities which 
favored retaining and/or strengthening the Funeral Rule.  Most 
funeral service providers, however, favored repealing or 
weakening the Funeral Rule. 
 In May, 1988, the formal rulemaking proceedings began 
when the FTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.  This notice 
informed recipients that the issue of banning casket handling 
fees would be considered by the FTC.  More comments were 
submitted (189), public hearings were held in three cities, and 
evidence, including surveys, was presented to a presiding 
officer.  After the testimony of 83 witnesses was presented, 
interested groups submitted rebuttal statements and proposed 
findings, as well as comments on later reports filed by the FTC 
staff. 
The Casket Handling Fee Amendment 
 Prior to the enactment of the Funeral Rule, funeral 
service providers (i.e., funeral homes) were virtually the only 
parties selling funeral goods.  However, after the implementation 
of the Funeral Rule, the way was paved for third parties to 
provide various funeral goods -- namely caskets.  Because funeral 
service providers could no longer require a consumer to purchase 
a casket in order to receive any other funeral services, third 
  
parties stepped into the markets, but only in some areas.3  The 
third parties began selling caskets, primarily on a pre-need 
basis and usually at a substantially lower price than did the 
funeral homes.4    
 In reaction to the increased competition in the area of 
casket sales, funeral service providers began charging customers 
a "casket handling fee."  This fee averages $300.00 to $500.00, 
but can be as high as $1,000.00.  Funeral service providers 
charge this fee to customers who have purchased a casket from a 
third party, but who want to have the remainder of the funeral 
services conducted at the funeral home.  The casket handling fee 
is non-declinable, but funeral service providers do not charge 
this fee for "ship-ins," among other select customers.5  
Additionally, funeral service providers admit that there is 
absolutely no additional labor or service or handling involved 
when a customer provides a casket from a third party to justify 
                     
    
3Since many states require a person to be a licensed funeral 
service provider in order to be able to sell a casket, it is in a 
limited amount of states and areas that third parties were able 
to enter the market. 
    
4Funeral service providers generally seek to recoup their 
overhead costs and profits through the sale of caskets.  Thus, 
the mark-up on caskets at funeral homes is substantial and is 
often higher than a third party seller marks up his or her casket 
price. 
    
5
"Ship-ins" occur, for example, when the family resides in a 
place other than where the deceased died.  In those cases, a 
funeral home in the city where the person died will prepare the 
body and provide a casket.  That funeral home then "ships" the 
casket to the funeral home that will conduct the funeral. 
  
such a fee.  Rather, the casket handling fee is imposed solely to 
recover income from the "lost sale" of the casket. 
 The casket handling fees often negate any savings the 
consumer might have realized by buying a third party, less 
expensive casket.  In fact, sometimes the imposition of the 
casket handling fee results in a higher overall "price" for a 
third party casket as opposed to the caskets sold by funeral 
homes.  As a result, some consumers cancel their third party 
casket purchases since they would end up paying more overall than 
if they simply bought the casket from the funeral home.  
Increased cancellations have evidently caused third party casket 
sellers to be forced out of the market.  Therefore, the FTC 
promulgated the following as amended Section 453.4(b)(1)(ii) of 
the Funeral Rule which makes it an unfair practice for a funeral 
service provider to: 
 Charge any fee as a condition to furnishing 
any funeral goods or funeral services to a 
person arranging a funeral, other than a fee 
for:  (1) Services of funeral director and 
staff, permitted by § 453.2(b)(4)(iii)(C);  
(2) other funeral services and funeral goods 
selected by the purchaser;  and (3) other 
funeral goods or services required to be 
purchased [by law]. . . 
16 C.F.R.§ 453. 
 The FTC did not intend the amended Funeral Rule to 
prohibit funeral service providers from recouping overhead costs 
or making profits.  Rather, the amendment was intended to make 
clear that only one non-declinable fee could be charged (the one 
for the professional services of the funeral director), and that 
  
funeral service providers could not seek to recoup overhead and 
make profits by only charging a casket handling fee to those 
people who chose to purchase their casket from a competitor.  
 
 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The FTC asserts that the amendment at issue here is 
entitled to a presumption of validity because it merely closes a 
loophole in the original Funeral Rule, and clarifies the ban on 
"bundling."  However, any substantive amendment to an FTC trade 
regulation rule is subject to the same judicial review as a rule.  
Section 18(d)(2)(B) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(2)(B).  
While the amendment may be related to "unbundling," which was 
addressed by the original Funeral Rule, the amendment is not 
merely a clarification.  Rather, the amendment at issue here 
prohibits a practice that was not being used by funeral service 
providers at the time the Funeral Rule was enacted.  Further, 
nothing in the FTC Act indicates that amendments are entitled to 
a presumption of validity.   
 On the other hand, to the extent that some bases for 
the original Funeral Rule apply here, this court can look to the 
Fourth Circuit's findings in Harry & Bryant Co., 726 F.2d 993 for 
guidance.  Therefore, the court will consider the amendment as it 
would any FTC regulation rule, taking into consideration that the 
Fourth Circuit has already sustained the FTC's findings that 
bundling and tying provisions harm consumers, that consumers 
cannot avoid such injury, and that the benefits of regulating 
bundling practices outweigh the costs. 
  
 Congress established a hybrid standard for judicial 
review of FTC regulation rules.  Essentially, a court may set 
aside the FTC conclusion if it is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the rulemaking record taken as a whole, 15 U.S.C. § 
57a(e)(3), American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 686 
(3d Cir. 1982), or if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.  American 
Financial Services v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986);  American Optometric 
Association v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896, 904-906 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  The 
substantial evidence standard is applied only to the FTC's 
factual determinations, while the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is applied to all other determinations and conclusions.  
American Financial Services, 767 F.2d at 985. 
 A factual finding is supported by substantial evidence 
if the record contains "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  American 
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981);  
American Home Products Corp., 695 F.2d at 686;  American 
Financial Services, 767 F.2d 957.  A court is not permitted to 
reweigh the evidence when determining whether the record contains 
substantial evidence to support the FTC's conclusion.  Steadman 
v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98-99, 100 n.20 (1981), reh'g. denied, 451 
U.S. 933 (1981);  Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 869 F.2d 719, 753 (3d Cir. 1989);  
American Home Products Corp., 695 F.2d at 686. 
  
 The arbitrary and capricious standard is very 
deferential.  Environmental Defense Council v. Costle, 657 F.2d 
275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981);  see Monsour Medical Center v. 
Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 
U.S. 905 (1987).  When considering agency conclusions under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, the court must determine 
whether the decision was based on consideration of relevant 
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.  
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971);  see Davis Enterprises v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1186 (3d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).  Additionally, 
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.  
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1061 (1992);  Moats v. 
United Mineworkers of America Health & Retirement Funds, 981 F.2d 
685 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 ANALYSIS 
 The PFDA argues that the FTC has imposed on itself a 
five-part test, each part of which must be satisfied in order to 
promulgate a regulation rule.6  In turn, the PFDA wants this 
                     
    
6The five-part test includes:  (1) a statement as to the 
prevalence of the practice the FTC seeks to regulate;  (2) a 
finding or conclusion that the practice causes substantial 
consumer injury;  (3) a finding or conclusion that the rule or 
regulation would reduce such consumer injury;  (4)  a finding or 
conclusion that the benefits to be derived from the rule or 
regulation outweigh the costs imposed by the rule or regulation;  
and, (5)  a finding or conclusion that consumers cannot 
reasonably avoid the injury that the practice causes.  Ophthalmic 
Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 10285, 10287, 16 C.F.R. § 456 (1989) 
(citing American Financial Services Ass'n., 767 F.2d at 971;  
Rule on Sale of Used Motor Vehicles, Statement of Basis and 
  
court to apply that five-part test in assessing whether the ban 
on casket handling fees should be affirmed.  Nothing in the FTC 
Act requires a reviewing court to rigidly adhere to this test 
which the FTC merely suggests to itself as a means of ensuring 
that its regulation rules are justified.  Yet, since the FTC has 
essentially made findings and conclusions in the context of those 
five inquiries, the court will use the five-part test as a guide 
to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial 
evidence and/or are arbitrary and capricious. 
The FTC's Finding as to the Prevalence of Casket Handling Fees 
 What the PFDA appears to complain of most is that the 
FTC did not make an adequate finding as to the prevalence of 
casket handling fees.  The PFDA contends that the FTC finding 
that "substantial 'casket handling fees' are imposed on consumers 
by a significant portion of providers wherever third-party casket 
sellers exist," Funeral Industry Practices;  Final Amended Trade 
Regulation Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592, 1604, 16 C.F.R. § 453 (1994), 
was based on flawed or insubstantial evidence and is not an 
adequate statement as to the prevalence of casket handling fees. 
 However, contrary to what the PFDA asserts -- that 
methodologically sound quantitative data must show that the 
practice sought to be regulated occurs with some frequency -- a 
"finding as to prevalence" requires neither that substantial, 
                                                                  
Purpose, 49 Fed. Reg. 45692, 45703, 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1984);  
Credit Practices Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 7740, 7742, 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1984);  Letter from FTC to 
Senators Wendell H. Ford and John C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980)). 
  
rigorous, quantitative studies be done, nor that the practice 
occurs in a certain percentage of transactions throughout the 
country.  In fact, the FTC's Rulemaking and Investigatory 
Procedures merely require that the FTC make a "statement as to 
the prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule."  
Organization Changes in the Commission's Rulemaking and 
Investigatory Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26284, 26289, 16 C.F.R. §§ 
0-5 (1981) (emphasis added).  
 "Prevalence" has never been strictly defined by the FTC 
or the courts.  The FTC has stated, though, that a statement as 
to prevalence (as well as answers to the other four inquiries) 
will "vary depending on the circumstances of each rulemaking and 
the characteristics of the industry involved."  Ophthalmic 
Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. at 10287, 16 C.F.R. § 456 (citing 49 
Fed. Reg. 7740, 7742 n.4).  Indeed, "[n]either the statutory 
language nor the legislative history of the [FTC] Act suggests 
that in 1975 Congress intended to require the [FTC] to find as a 
pre-condition to rulemaking that acts or practices to be 
regulated are prevalent."  Trade Regulation Rule, Mail or 
Telephone Order Merchandise, 58 Fed. Reg. 49096, 49100 n.61, 16 
C.F.R. § 435 (citing 15 U.S.C. section 57a(d)(1)(A);  Joint H.R. 
and S. Conf. Rep. No. 1408, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7764).  Further, even where 
there is a limited record as to the prevalence of a practice on a 
nationwide basis or where the data reviewed only relates to a few 
states, the practice can be found to be prevalent enough to 
warrant a regulation.  Trade Regulation Rule;  Credit Practices, 
  
49 Fed. Reg. at 7752, 16 C.F.R. § 444, affirmed by American 
Financial Services Ass'n., 767 F.2d 957 (limited record evidence 
existed with respect to the prevalence of the practice; evidence 
showed that practice occurred in just a few states and only in a 
small percentage of transactions, but despite the inability to 
precisely quantify the evidence, the FTC found that the practice 
was probably more widespread than the data indicated and at any 
rate was prevalent enough to warrant promulgating a regulation 
rule);  see also Amendment to Trade Regulation Rule Concerning 
Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel and Certain Piece Goods, 
48 Fed. Reg. 22733, 22743, 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1983) (record did not 
permit a determination of how widespread the practice was, just 
that it did occur and FTC adopted amendment). Additionally, 
studies upon which a finding as to prevalence is based need not 
be projected to the entire nation where the practice is limited, 
prohibited, or regulated in many areas anyway by state law.  
Trade Regulation Rule;  Credit Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. at 7752, 
16 C.F.R. § 444, affirmed by American Financial Services Ass'n., 
767 F.2d 957 (because practice sought to be regulated was 
forbidden by state law in many areas, practice did not need to 
occur throughout nation in order to be subject to regulation).  
Overall, then, there appears to be no mandate that a practice be 
prevalent (i.e., occur in a certain number of transactions) in 
order for the FTC to adopt a rule regulating the practice.  See 
Mail Order or Telephone Merchandise Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 49096, 
49100 n.61, 16 C.F.R. § 435 (1993);  Trade Regulation Rule;  
Credit Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. at 7753, 7757, 16 C.F.R. § 444. 
  
 Taking all of this into account, the FTC's finding as 
to the prevalence of casket handling fees is supported by 
substantial evidence in the rulemaking record taken as a whole.  
First, the FTC noted that third party casket sellers only number 
approximately 150-200 in the whole United States.7  Additionally, 
those sellers are concentrated primarily in three states -- 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan -- because many states prohibit 
anyone but a licensed funeral service provider from selling 
caskets.  Since casket sales by third parties is prohibited in 
most areas by state law, most funeral service providers have no 
need to impose casket handling fees.  Therefore, the practice of 
charging casket handling fees could not be widespread nationwide.  
See Trade Regulation Rule;  Credit Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. at 
7752, 16 C.F.R. § 444. 
 Second, the FTC relied on several things in making its 
finding as to prevalence:8  a study done by the Pre-Arrangement 
Association ("PAA");  corroborative testimony and statements by 
other witnesses;  and other surveys of casket handling fees in 
local markets.  The FTC admits that the PAA study was not the 
most statistically rigorous or comprehensive survey.  However, 
conducting or relying on statistically rigorous and comprehensive 
                     
    
7The small number of documented third party casket sellers is 
probably due, in part, to the fact that third party casket 
sellers were literally non-existent prior to the 1982 
implementation of the original Funeral Rule. 
    
8The PFDA argues that the FTC relied exclusively on the Pre-
Arrangement Association study, which the PFDA argues was not 
statistically rigorous and was conducted in a biassed manner. 
  
studies is not necessary in making a finding as to prevalence.  
See Mail Order or Telephone Merchandise Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. at 
49108, 49109, 16 C.F.R. § 435;  Trade Regulation Rule;  Credit 
Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. at 7742, 16 C.F.R. § 444.  Nevertheless, 
the court does recognize that some basis or evidence must exist 
to suggest that the practice the FTC rule seeks to regulate does 
indeed occur, and, with respect to the incidence of casket 
handling fees, substantial evidence supports a finding that the 
practice exists.9 
 The PAA evaluated 31 responses from third party casket 
sellers to a survey about whether casket handling fees are 
imposed.  All 31 respondents said that casket handling fees were 
                     
    
9The PFDA, in addition to attacking the results of the PAA 
study, complains that the survey itself was conducted in a 
biassed manner.  So, not only were the results on their face 
woefully inadequate -- according to the PFDA -- to support a 
finding as to prevalence, but the results may even have been 
skewed.  The PFDA asserts that because a cover letter that 
accompanied the PAA survey stated that the results would be used 
"to present to the FTC testimony on the impact that casket 
handling fees have had on the third party sale of funeral 
merchandise,"  Letter from Dayne Sieling, Executive Director of 
the PAA to Members of all State Cemetery Associations dated 
October 12, 1988, the survey itself was injected with bias. 
 
 While not claiming to be experts on statistical analysis, 
the court finds that the cover letter did not infect the PAA 
study so as to render it unusable or unreliable.  For example, 
the cover letter did not state that the PAA would use the survey 
to get the FTC to ban casket handling fees, and, without 
responses indicating that such fees are imposed, the ban would 
never occur.  Rather, the cover letter just stated that the issue 
of casket handling fees would be addressed at upcoming FTC 
hearings.  Moreover, the FTC reviewed the PAA survey before it 
was distributed in order to ensure that it was valid.  Therefore, 
the court rejects the PFDA's argument that the cover letters sent 
with the PAA survey so infected the survey with bias that it was 
arbitrary and capricious for the FTC to rely on it. 
  
imposed in their market areas.  Eighty-six percent of respondents 
said that at least 60% of the funeral homes in their market areas 
assessed such fees;  66% indicated that the fees were imposed by 
at least 80% of the funeral homes;  48% of respondents stated 
that at least 90% of the funeral homes in their areas assessed 
casket handling fees;  and 24% of respondents indicated that 100% 
of the funeral homes in their market area used such a fee.  
Testimony of Duke Radovich. 
 Additionally, most of the witnesses who testified at 
the rulemaking hearings indicated that where third party casket 
sellers exist, a significant number of funeral service providers 
imposed casket handling fees.  The other informal surveys the FTC 
relied on were surveys conducted by a journalist, by a third 
party casket seller, who surveyed funeral homes, and a third done 
by asking funeral customers questions.  Once again, all of these 
"studies" indicated that where third party casket sellers exist, 
substantial casket handling fees are imposed by funeral service 
providers.  In fact, the results showed that many customers of 
the third party casket sellers ended up canceling their third 
party contracts to avoid paying more overall than if they had 
purchased their casket at the funeral home.  This corroborative 
testimony and anecdotal evidence buttresses the FTC's finding as 
to the prevalence of casket handling fees. 
 Finally, the study that the PFDA would like the FTC and 
this court to rely on (exclusively) -- funeral transaction 
records collected by the Federated Funeral Directors of America 
("FFDA") -- is not entirely applicable because that study 
  
indicated that a very small percentage of funeral service 
transactions involve a casket handling fee (0.05%).  This result 
occurred for probably two reasons.  First, the survey sampled 
funeral transactions throughout the country.  As stated above, 
third party casket sellers are concentrated in only a few areas 
and a survey of the entire nation would obscure the prevalence of 
the fees in the areas where third party casket sellers exist.  
Second, the FFDA transaction sheets that were evaluated did not 
specifically ask about casket handling fees.  Rather, the 
transaction sheets merely asked for an itemized price list of 
what was charged to a customer.  Because it is apparent that many 
funeral service providers convince customers to cancel their 
third party contracts and buy the casket from the funeral 
director, a fee would not appear on a final bill.  Moreover, 
because casket handling fees are not really a good or a service, 
they might not show up as a separate item on a final bill.  
Therefore, the FTC did not act arbitrarily in declining to rely 
solely on the FFDA study. 
 Overall, the PAA study, the informal surveys, the 
testimony, and the anecdotal evidence all indicate that where 
third party caskets are sold, a significant number of funeral 
homes impose casket handling fees.  The PFDA does not contest 
this conclusion, but merely argues that the FTC did not rely on 
statistically sound studies and that the practice does not occur 
often enough throughout the country to justify a ban on the 
practice.  Therefore, the FTC's finding as to the prevalence of 
  
casket handling fees was supported by substantial evidence in the 
rulemaking record taken as a whole. 
Whether Casket Handling Fees Cause Substantial Consumer Injury 
 The FTC concluded that since the casket handling fees 
are non-declinable and are tied to the purchase of a casket, they 
frustrate the underlying principle of the original Funeral Rule's 
anti-bundling provisions.  Funeral Industry Practices;  Final 
Amended Trade Regulation Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592, 1604, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 453.  Therefore, the consumer is injured in that the right to 
decline to purchase any item, including a casket, from a funeral 
service provider "is illusory if funeral providers can condition 
consumers' choice on the payment of an additional, non-declinable 
fee."  Id. at 1604.  Further, consumer choice is restricted 
because the casket handling fee operates as a penalty for 
exercising that choice. 
 At the outset, the court notes that the original 
Funeral Rule's regulations were enacted, in large part, to 
eliminate bundling.  The FTC concluded with respect to the 
original Funeral Rule, and the Fourth Circuit agreed, that 
bundling, or forcing a customer to pay for any item aside from 
the one non-declinable professional service fee, injured 
consumers.  With respect to the amendment at issue here, the FTC 
concluded that casket handling fees constitute bundling insofar 
as they are unfair conditions on a customer's right to decline an 
unwanted item.10  That conclusion was neither arbitrary nor 
                     
    
10For example, funeral service providers essentially say, 
"either buy your casket here, or we'll charge you for it anyway." 
  
capricious since bundling speaks of forcing consumers to pay for 
items or services that they do not want.  Therefore, as discussed 
above, the court will consider that the Fourth Circuit has 
already determined that bundling causes consumers substantial 
injury as part of the analysis of whether the FTC's conclusion 
that casket handling fees cause substantial consumer injury is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
 The PFDA argues that because a casket handling fee is 
only imposed to make sure that those customers buying caskets 
from third parties pay their fair share of the funeral home's 
overhead costs, no consumer injury occurs.  That argument is 
interesting because the PFDA further argues that if no casket 
handling fee is imposed, the customers who do buy their caskets 
from the funeral home will be penalized by having to subsidize 
the ones who purchase caskets elsewhere.  But blaming or 
penalizing the consumer who had the wherewithal to purchase a 
less expensive casket ahead of time from a third party is unfair 
since who pays what to whom is merely a function of how the 
funeral director chooses to recoup his or her overhead costs.  In 
other words, the funeral director does not need to use the mark-
up on a casket to recoup those costs, especially knowing that 
some casket sales may be lost to third parties;  that is what the 
non-declinable service fee is for.  Every consumer using a 
funeral home "uses" the overhead of the funeral director.  Yet, 
because funeral service directors are unwilling to redistribute 
costs and recoup overhead through the one fee they are permitted 
to charge everyone, some consumers are penalized for exercising 
  
choice in purchasing caskets.  Those consumers are forced to pay 
for something they do not want -- the mark-up on the funeral 
home's casket which the consumer did not even buy. 
 Another indication that the casket handling fee is a 
penalty is that no extra labor, liability, time, or other cost is 
involved in "handling" a third party casket.  See Testimony of 
Wendell Hahn.  If customers who purchase a third party casket are 
not "costing" the funeral homes anything extra, there really is 
no justification for charging them a several-hundred dollar fee 
other than to penalize them for not buying a casket from the 
funeral home.   
 Additionally, funeral homes do not charge such handling 
fees for ship-ins.  Even though the families of these deceased 
have caused the funeral home to lose a sale on a casket, and even 
though the families of these deceased are not "paying their fair 
share of the funeral home's overhead costs," they are not charged 
casket handling fees.  This shows that only those consumers who 
make a conscious choice to purchase a casket from a third party 
pay this fee.   
 Such a fee can only be described as a penalty for 
exercising choice in purchasing a good and as a method of forcing 
consumers to purchase a casket from a funeral home, or at least 
pay the funeral home the mark-up on a casket so that the consumer 
may as well have bought it from the funeral home.  This 
constitutes substantial consumer injury, especially in light of 
the FTC's finding, sustained by the Fourth Circuit, that bundling 
injures consumers.  Therefore, the FTC's conclusion that casket 
  
handling fees cause substantial consumer injury is supported by 
substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. 
The FTC's Conclusion that a Ban on Casket Handling Fees Will 
Reduce Such Consumer Injury 
 The FTC implicitly found that a ban on casket handling 
fees would reduce consumer injury.  The PFDA argues that the ban 
will not reduce consumer injury because funeral service providers 
can circumvent the ban by creating packages, all of which include 
caskets, and offering discounts on those packages.  Since only 
those people buying a casket from the funeral home would get such 
a discount, the person who buys a third party casket would be 
paying an indirect fee.  Thus, according to the PFDA, the 
consumer injury still exists. 
 On the other hand, the FTC distinguishes direct casket 
handling fees from offering discounts to people who buy caskets 
from the funeral home.  The former is an anti-competitive penalty 
(the fee) and the latter is a method used to deal with 
competition from third party casket sellers which is pro-
competitive.  The fee essentially requires consumers to buy their 
caskets from funeral homes, or pay for it anyway.  The other 
methods (e.g., discounts) represent a way to encourage consumers 
to buy their caskets from funeral homes. 
 As the FTC points out, the purpose of the ban is not to 
prevent funeral service providers from recouping overhead costs 
or making a profit.  Rather, the purpose is to encourage 
consumers to exercise choice in the marketplace, especially with 
the entrance of third party competitors, and to prevent funeral 
  
homes from effectively prohibiting that choice.  The injury the 
casket handling fees cause is not measured in terms of dollar 
amounts the consumer pays, but in terms of prohibiting the 
customer from choosing where he or she buys a casket.  Therefore, 
the fact that people who buy caskets from third parties may end 
up realizing a smaller savings as a result of not obtaining a 
discount at the funeral home does not mean that they are still 
being injured. 
 While the "circumvention" methods of avoiding the ban 
on casket handling fees does appear to weaken the FTC's position, 
it does not destroy it.  First, it is evident that the FTC 
considered this issue and determined that it was not a 
significant enough factor to abandon the amendment.  Second, 
although it does seem that customers who buy their caskets from 
third parties still may end up paying some sort of indirect fee 
as a result of exercising that choice, a likelihood exists that 
funeral homes will simply restructure their prices such that the 
overhead and profits are recouped somewhere other than in the 
mark-up on a casket.  Moreover, the discounting method is not 
anti-competitive like the direct casket handling fee.  For all of 
these reasons, the FTC's conclusion that the ban on casket 
handling fees will reduce consumer injury is supported by 
substantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious. 
The FTC's Conclusion that the Benefits to be Derived from the Ban 
Outweigh the Costs 
 There are several benefits to be realized by the ban on 
casket handling fees.  Consumers will have increased choice in 
  
the purchase of caskets.  Consumers will not be penalized for 
exercising that choice. Additionally, competition in the market 
for caskets can be expected to increase with the ban in effect, 
given the fact that many third party casket sellers went out of 
business as a result of casket handling fees.  Increasing 
competition in the casket market is likely to drive the cost of 
caskets down.  All consumers will benefit from this result. 
 The FTC recognized some costs which will probably be 
incurred by this ban.  Since funeral service providers who now 
charge a casket handling fee will have to restructure their 
prices, the most significant cost is that many funeral service 
providers will probably raise the amount of their non-declinable 
professional service fees in order to ensure that they recoup 
overhead costs.  Therefore, every consumer may end up paying a 
little bit more for that fee in the short run.  However, the FTC 
concluded that the long-term effect of the ban will be increased 
competition in the casket market such that prices will eventually 
go down and all consumers will pay less.  Additionally, the FTC 
found the cost to the funeral industry of having to restructure 
their pricing methods in order to recoup overhead costs and make 
profits was insignificant, especially in light of the fact that 
the funeral service industry presented no evidence regarding the 
costs it might incur in restructuring its pricing scheme. 
 The PFDA's main contention with the FTC's cost-benefit 
analysis is that it is not tied to any quantitative data.  
However, quantitative data is not necessary in such an 
evaluation.  See Mail Order Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. at 49108, 49109, 
  
16 C.F.R. § 435;  American Financial Services, 767 F.2d at 986.  
Additionally, much of a cost-benefit analysis requires 
predictions and speculation, in any context.  An absence of 
quantitative data here is not fatal to the FTC's analysis. 
 Finally, the PFDA asserts that the FTC's conclusion 
that the ban on casket handling fees will result in more 
competitive prices was flawed.  The PFDA argues that since the 
original Funeral Rule has not resulted in increased competition, 
neither will this amendment.  However, evidence showed that while 
casket fees had risen in the years since the Funeral Rule went 
into effect, the retail price had increased less than the 
wholesale price charged to funeral homes by distributors.  It 
appears, then, that funeral service providers are responding as 
expected to the Funeral Rule by not raising retail prices on 
caskets to reflect the rise of wholesale prices;  since prices 
have not risen as much as they could have to retain the same 
profit margin, prices have, in effect, been lowered. 
 Additionally, the advent of the casket handling fee as 
a method of dealing with competition has precluded much true 
competition from third parties which would ordinarily result in 
prices charged being driven down.  Therefore, overall, the FTC's 
cost-benefit analysis, which lead the FTC to conclude that the 
benefits of the ban on casket handling fees outweigh the costs, 
was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. 
The FTC's Conclusion that Consumers Cannot Reasonably Avoid the 
Injury Caused by Casket Handling Fees 
  
 The final prong of the five-part test involves whether 
consumers can reasonably avoid the injury caused by casket 
handling fees, thereby making the ban unnecessary.  The consumer 
injury is the restriction of choice when it comes to buying a 
casket and the fact that a penalty is imposed when a consumer 
exercises that choice in favor of a third party casket seller, 
but against a funeral home.  The PFDA argues that since there are 
no consumer complaints in the record, consumers are obviously 
avoiding the injury, or do not consider themselves "injured" by 
the fee.11   
 However, this argument is premised on the assumption 
that consumers who wish to avoid the fee can shop around to find 
a funeral provider who does not charge such a fee.  That is a 
faulty assumption.  The reason the FTC promulgated the original 
Funeral Rule was because of the particular vulnerability of 
funeral service consumers.  Funeral consumers are forced to make 
many of the choices involved in arranging a funeral in a bereaved 
state and often do not have time to "shop around" at the time of 
death of a loved one.  Consequently, those consumers are in no 
position to seek out a funeral service provider who will not 
charge them a casket handling fee, if one even exists in their 
immediate geographic area. 
                     
    
11The PFDA also argues that market forces will keep the 
amount of casket handling fees down such that consumers can avoid 
injury.  This argument is irrelevant given that the FTC does not 
define the consumer injury by the amount of the casket handling 
fee, but rather as the fact that such a fee is imposed. 
  
 Further, the studies discussed above show that where 
third party casket sellers exist, a significant number of funeral 
service providers charge casket handling fees.  This indicates 
that most consumers who wish to and do purchase third party 
caskets will pay a fee for exercising that choice.  If the 
consumer cannot or will not pay the fee, he or she is forced to 
buy the casket from the funeral home.  That is no choice.  
Therefore, the injury, as defined by the FTC -- restriction on 
choice and being penalized for exercising that choice -- cannot 
be avoided by consumers.  The FTC's conclusion as to the 
unavoidability of the injury is supported by substantial evidence 
and is not arbitrary or capricious. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 After careful review of the entire record, it appears 
that none of the conclusions the FTC reached was arbitrary or 
capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
rulemaking record taken as a whole.  Therefore, for all of the 
reasons stated above, the petition for review will be denied. 
 
